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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3485
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3942
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2914
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5477
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3144
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4167
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4824
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1611
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0964
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0510

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT 000734

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DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009

TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL

SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: MOROCCANS NERVOUS ABOUT IMPENDING

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

REF: RABAT 722

Classified By: Pol/C Tim Lenderking for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

- 11. (C) Deputy FM Fassi Fihri telephoned the Ambassador late afternoon April 20 to express concern about the contents of the SYG's report on the Western Sahara, soon to be released, as well as impending action on the Western Sahara by the UN Security Council. Fassi Fihri understood that the Security Council would likely pursue a six-month rollover, and that the SYG report would call for a dialogue with the parties, with Algeria and Mauritania participating as neighboring states. He understood the SYG's report on Morocco was negative, particularly in the area of human rights, but that the report would call for a solution not to be imposed. Fassi Fihri said Morocco was concerned about the report given that Morocco needed time to do its "homework," i.e., carry out its process of internal consultations regarding the autonomy proposal. He also felt that the report was very one-sided, failing to mention anything about unhelpful speeches and comments from the Polisario and the GOA.
- 12. (C) Fassi Fihri believed Ambassador Bolton was in Washington and was perhaps discussing reducing the rollover period from six months. Ambassador Bolton had met with Moroccan PermRep Sahel this week, Fassi Fihri said, and had suggested that the rollover would be either six or nine months. Fassi Fihri reiterated his points made to the Ambassador during their April 17 meeting (reftel), insisting the Moroccan autonomy project was "irreversible." Morocco needed time for domestic consideration of the issue, he said. Right now, he said, Morocco was focused on getting through the end of April, after which the situation should ease. Being taken to task for human rights violations would be a catastrophe for Morocco, he said.
- 13. (C) Fassi Fihri was also very concerned at the prospect that the SYG could not ask the Security Council to consider autonomy for the Western Sahara because no country recognized Morocco's sovereignty over the territory. He understood the Algerian PermRep had met with UNSYG Annan and that the GOA and Polisario very happy with the direction in which things were moving.
- $\P4$. (C) In light of this, Fassi Fihri said Morocco hoped it could count on its friends to avoid negative language in the

resolution, which would play very badly in Morocco, including in the press. He reiterated that the Moroccans had taken good notes from their recent meetings in Washington; they knew what had to be done: meet with the Polisario and work hard on their autonomy proposal. Fassi Fihri closed by hoping that the Ambassador was aware of the two-hour television program on CORCAS the night of April 17, in which CORCAS President Khali Henna had taken questions from journalists and stated publicly that CORCAS was committed to incorporating differing points of view, including reaching out to the Polisario. The Ambassador said he was aware of the program.

15. (C) The Ambassador received a second call from Fassi Fihri at 1030 local time on April 21, asking for his availability for a meeting at the MFA with the P-5, presumably to reiterate the points made in his phone call the previous day. The meeting is tentatively scheduled for 1300 local (0900 EDT). Post will report septel.

Riley